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Two of the most discussed administrative-law theories in 
contemporary discussion are executive preemption and big 
waiver. Executive preemption is the idea that agency regulations 
preempt state law by extension of the federal statutes the agencies 
are charged with enforcing. Big waiver is the idea that Congress 
delegates, to administrative agencies, the power to waive 
statutory provisions. 
The constitutional questions raised by executive preemption 
and big waiver can be put in the following terms. Executive 
preemption raises constitutional issues as regulatory agencies go 
farther and farther away from the “clear statement” of a given 
statute. Thus, one wonders whether agencies are turning 
themselves into an unconstitutional lawmaking body. Big waiver 
also raises constitutional issues. To some, it inverts the traditional 
approach to delegation and allows regulatory agencies to, in part, 
cancel laws that Congress passed. 
Executive preemption and big waiver currently constitute 
two separate theories of administrative law. This paper instead 
argues that these theories should be thought of in tandem. 
Executive preemption takes rights away from the states and big 
waiver gives rights back. As such, these tools allow agencies to 
balance federalism concerns in our present era of legislative 
gridlock. 
 Associate, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. I would like to thank Professor Jed 
Stiglitz, Stefan Golubovic, and Nicholas Passaro for their invaluable feedback 
throughout this article's development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The agency giveth and the agency taketh away. 
The prognosis as to why Congress is engaged in an 
unprecedented position of legislative gridlock is a subject of 
discussion in and of itself. However, more relevant to this paper 
are the inevitable responses agencies adopt in response to 
changing conditions. Naturally, our understanding of what these 
agencies are doing must also change. The two theories put forth 
in this paper are two of the most often-discussed, namely 
executive preemption and big waiver. Executive preemption is 
the idea that agency regulations preempt state law by extension of 
the federal statutes that the agencies are charged with enforcing.1 
Big waiver is the idea that Congress delegates the power to waive 
statutory provisions to administrative agencies either explicitly or 
implicitly.2 
The constitutional questions raised by executive preemption 
and big waiver can be put in the following terms. Executive 
preemption raises constitutional issues as regulatory agencies go 
farther and farther away from the “clear statement” of a given 
statute.3 Thus, one wonders whether agencies are turning 
themselves into an unconstitutional lawmaking body.4 Big waiver 
also raises constitutional issues. To some, it inverts the traditional 
approach to delegation and allows regulatory agencies to, in part, 
cancel laws that Congress passed.5 
Executive preemption and big waiver currently constitute 
two separate theories of administrative law.6 This paper argues 
that doing so is inefficient and ineffective. This paper instead 
argues that these theories should be thought of in tandem. 
Executive preemption takes rights away from the states and big 
1. See Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 869-71
(2008). 
2. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 272-73 (2013). 
3. See Young, supra note 1, at 870-71; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (holding that agencies receive preemptive effect only from a “clear 
statement” of the statute). 
4. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 277-79.
5. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 278.
6. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 272-73; Young, supra note 1, at 869-71.
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waiver gives rights back. As such, these theories counterbalance 
each other in a manner that benefits federalism, namely by 
allotting rights and powers in a way most efficient for the 
administration of government. 
This paper will proceed in four parts. Part I discusses the 
concepts of executive preemption and big waiver. Part II 
discusses the current constitutional debate surrounding these 
theories. Part III argues that both theories should be thought of in 
tandem as mutually reinforcing each other, thus creating 
administrative balance. Part IV argues that adopting 
administrative balance promotes federalism as it exists within the 
current environment of legislative gridlock. 
I. A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION
The Supremacy Clause states that “the [l]aws of the United 
States . . . shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and.”7 Under the 
Supremacy Clause, federal laws preempt state laws in cases 
where a conflict arises between the two.8 This is the clear meaning 
of the Supremacy Clause, which renders the preemptive power of 
federal statutes, in theory, unquestionably constitutional.9 In 
many ways, the preemptive power of federal statutes could be 
termed “classic preemption.” However, Congress simply passes 
statutes, it doesn’t enforce them. What preemptive power, then, 
do regulatory agencies have in promulgating regulations in 
furtherance of enforcing a federal statute? 
Executive preemption is the idea that regulatory agencies’ 
regulations preempt state law by the power of the federal statutes 
that they are directed to enforce.10 Under the fiction of executive 
preemption, administrative agencies carry out the statutes passed 
by Congress, which by their own effect have preemptive power.11 
Thus, in carrying out federal statutes administrative agencies 
obtain preemptive power by extension.12 Such an idea has existed 
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Young, supra note 1, at 869-71. 
11. See Young, supra note 1, at 869-71. 
12. See Young, supra note 1, at 869-71. 
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at least since the 1940s as a body of jurisprudence within 
administrative law.13 
That being said, the power of administrative agencies to 
preempt state law is not clear-cut. In fact, the Supreme Court has 
taken a somewhat winding road in refining its jurisprudence on 
executive preemption. One can see this with three of the most 
seminal administrative law cases of the 20th Century, namely 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., and 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense.14 
In Skidmore, petitioner employee argued that the respondent 
owed the petitioner wages for requiring the petitioner to be on-
call and on premises four nights a week after the petitioner had 
finished work.15 According to the petitioner this “waiting time” 
requirement violated the Fair Labor Standards Act according to 
interpretive documents and informal ruling of the U.S. 
Department of Labor.16 Respondent argued that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act was silent on counting “waiting time” as working 
hours, which allowed the respondent to require “waiting time” 
without paying for it.17 Skidmore helped to define a concept of 
judicial interpretation known as Skidmore deference.18 Skidmore 
holds that “[t]he weight of [an agency’s] judgment in a particular 
case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give 
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”19 This 
Skidmore deference gives weight to agency determinations in 
judicial proceedings, yet declines to give such determinations the 
weight of law.20 In so many words, under Skidmore 
administrative agencies have no preemptive power per se, but in 
some cases preemptive power may be found depending on the 
weight of the agency determinations.21 This somewhat seesawing 
13. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
14. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
15. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135-36. 
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Young, supra note 1, at 890.
19. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
20. See Young, supra note 1, at 890.
21. See id.
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opinion was followed just three years later by a more bright line 
ruling—Rice.22 
In Rice, petitioner argued that respondents, Illinois 
warehousemen engaged in operating public warehouses for 
storage of grain, violated the Illinois Public Utilities Act and the 
Illinois Grain Warehouse Act.23 Respondents in Rice argued that 
the United States Warehouse Act preempted the Illinois law.24 
The holding in Rice helped form what exactly administrative 
agencies need in order to justify the argument that a federal statute 
preempts state law.25 Rice held that “the historic police powers of 
the States are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”26 This is 
colloquially known as the “clear statement rule,” which requires 
that an administrative agency claiming preemptive power must 
find the power in a clear statement of a federal statute.27 In many 
ways, Rice did the opposite of what Skidmore did. Rice created a 
bright line rule in favor of anti-preemption except in cases where 
it was clear that Congress intended to preempt state law.28 The 
clear statement rule was axiomatic until Chevron, which creates 
a conflict as to how courts interpret Rice’s “presumption against 
preemption.”29 
In Chevron, petitioner argued that an EPA regulation, which 
allowed states to treat pollution-emitting devices within the same 
industrial grouping as a single group was a reasonable 
interpretation of a “stationary source.”30 Respondent argued that 
the EPA regulation was a contradictory interpretation of the term 
“stationary source,” and thus the regulation was invalid.31 The 
holding in Chevron ultimately formed what is now known as the 
Chevron doctrine.32 Under Chevron, when a statute is silent or 
ambiguous a court will defer to the agency’s interpretation if that 
22. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
23. See id. at 220–22. 
24. See id. at 220–23. 
25. See id. at 230.
26. Id. at 230. 
27. See Young, supra note 1, at 877.
28. See Young, supra note 1, at 877.
29. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Young, supra note 1, at 883-85. 
30. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 
(1984). 
31. See id. at 842.
32. See Young, supra note 1, at 883-85, 899.
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interpretation is reasonable.33 In many ways this counters Rice’s 
bright line rule insofar as Chevron treats a statute’s silence as an 
implied delegation of authority to the agency charged with its 
enforcement.34 As this paper will later discuss, Rice and Chevron 
are often in conflict with each other in regard to executive 
preemption, with Skidmore doing little to alleviate such tension. 
B. BIG WAIVER
The concept of waiver is a long-standing administrative 
power.35 Most traditionally, waiver gives administrative agencies 
the power to waive regulations that they themselves 
promulgated.36 This waiver power could be termed “classic 
waiver.” The reason for classic waiver pertains to the delegated 
authority to enforce statutes, which requires the creation of 
regulations. In order to properly and effectively enforce statutes 
administrative agencies find it necessary, from time to time, to 
waive their own regulations.37 Waiving regulations keeps 
agencies’ regulatory framework current. 
Big waiver is the concept that Congress delegates the power 
to waive statutory provisions to administrative agencies either 
explicitly or implicitly.38 This is in contrast to the concept of 
classic waiver, which deals only with regulations of an agency’s 
own making.39 According to David J. Barron and Todd D. Rakoff, 
big waiver is a new, inverse, form of delegation. One can see this 
new form of delegation arise in two recent and well-known 
statutes, the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”) and the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).40 
NCLB’s main provision outlines certain conditions that 
states must satisfy in order to receive federal grants.41 To receive 
33. See Young, supra note 1, at 885. 
34. See Young, supra note 1, at 885.
35. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 276.
36. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 276.
37. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 276.
38. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 278.
39. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 276.
40. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and 42 
U.S.C.); Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 279, 81. 
41. See Baron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 279.
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federal grants, a state must submit a plan demonstrating the 
adoption of challenging academic standards.42 Schools must also 
adopt testing on those same standards.43 A state must then show 
“adequate yearly progress” of its students so that by 2013–14, all 
students “will meet or exceed the State’s proficient level of 
academic achievement.”44 Along with this requirement, NCLB 
allows the Secretary of Education to “waive any statutory or 
regulatory requirement of this chapter for . . . [an] educational 
agency that–(1) receives funds . . . and (2) requests a waiver . . . 
.”45 According to Barron and Rakoff: 
in terms of what the statute allows, and . . . what the 
Secretary proposes to do, this waiver is clearly “big.” It is, 
by design, a significant revision of what was spelled out in 
the statute . . . . For those states that qualify for the waiver, it 
creates a new regime.46 
The ACA uses waiver in a slightly different but no less “big” 
manner. Much of the ACA relies on delegations to the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services to create a regulatory framework 
in which the carry out the ACA.47 Within this delegation is an 
explicit provision that allows the Secretary to adopt an alternative 
health care scheme for states.48 This alternative scheme would 
waive key provisions of the ACA, including those relating to 
health care exchanges and the individual mandate.49 Though the 
ACA’s waiver is not nearly as big as the waiver power in the 
NCLB, it is still clearly “big.” According to Barron and Rakoff, 
the ACA’s waiver power “make[s] an all-things-considered 
judgment about whether there is some other framework . . . that 
states may adopt as an alternative to what Congress expressly 
prescribed.”50 
Though Barron and Rakoff define big waiver as requiring an 
explicit statutory waiver provision,51 perhaps big waiver is 
42. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 279–80.
43. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 279–80.
44. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 279.
45. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 280 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2006)).
46. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 280.
47. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 281-82.
48. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 281-82.
49. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 281-82.
50. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 282.
51. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 335.
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something broader. As United States v. Texas highlighted, big 
waiver may allow for temporary waiver of statutory provisions 
absent an explicit waiver provision.52 The quagmire of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)53 demonstrates why 
some courts have been willing to expand big waiver absent an 
explicit statutory provision. 
It is well-accepted that the INA is unworkable.54 Arguably, 
an easy remedy for this would be to have Congress overhaul the 
INA to make immigration framework workable. Theoretically, 
this new system could operate with the given amount of funding 
Congress would allot it. Unfortunately, Congress does not seem 
able to get anywhere close to correcting the INA for present 
application.55 So how should agencies act when required to 
enforce a statute that they neither have the resources nor the 
manpower to enforce? 
As to the INA, one thing agencies did was to utilize what one 
could view as a temporary form of big waiver. Two examples of 
this would be the programs Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (“DACA”)56 and Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans (“DAPA”).57 DACA and DAPA are, essentially, 
deferred action grants for a period of three years.58 These deferred 
action programs grant qualifying aliens a form of temporary legal 
status.59 The practical justification for these programs is to allow 
agencies to focus on priority illegal immigrants, namely illegal 
immigrants with criminal records.60 
52. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Texas v. United States, 805 
F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015). As to United States v. Texas, though affirming the Fifth Circuit’s
decision via an equally divided court, it remains key to a discussion of big waiver insofar as
the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of the extent to which a federal agency can waive statutory
directives.
53. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2016).
54. See Alex Nowrasteh, Repeal and Replace the Immigration and Nationality Act,
CATO INSTITUTE (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/repeal-
replace-immigration-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/MUW2-YGTY]. 
55. Id.
56. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-
action-childhood-arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/4M74-34HB] (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). 
57. See Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d at 660.
58. See id. at 664.
59. See id. at 660. 
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2016); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 18 (Jan. 25, 
2017). 
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DACA and DAPA qualify as big waiver because the INA 
requires that all illegal immigrants be deported absent a specific 
exception.61 This deportation mandate clearly applies to those 
under DACA and DAPA.62 But, the argument for DACA and 
DAPA is that the INA prioritizes deporting aliens with criminal 
records.63 This impliedly requires that noncriminal illegal 
immigrants receive temporary waivers of their illegal status in 
order to sift through the sheer amount of illegal immigrants. 
Though Texas succeeded in invalidating DAPA’s 
application in its eponymous case, the resolution of United States 
v. Texas has little bearing on the general constitutionality of
temporary big waiver.64 This is because the split decision in the
case simply invalidated DAPA as to the Fifth Circuit.65 Thus, in
the ten other circuits, DAPA stands as a valid extension of big
waiver when promulgated on a temporary basis.66
C. PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
THEORIES 
The practical justifications for these theories have to do 
mainly with the significant growth of the administrative state 
along with the current legislative gridlock in Congress. As to the 
first issue, it is clear that the administrative state has grown into a 
quasi-lawmaking body. As Justice White said in INS v. Chadha, 
“[f]or some time, the sheer amount of law . . . made by the 
agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by 
Congress through the traditional process.”67 But, even if agencies 
act as quasi-lawmaking bodies, the general assumption still holds 
that agencies defer to Congress as the primary lawmaking body.68 
Unfortunately, Congress is gridlocked. One can look at the 
number of laws Congress has recently passed and easily infer that 
61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1104.
62. See id.
63. See id. § 1103; Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 18.
64. See Alex Twinem, The Curious Case of United States v. Texas, THE STANFORD 




67. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
68. See id.
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Congress isn’t really “lawmaking” anymore.69 In some ways, one 
could argue that agencies, as more flexible bodies, have become 
quasi-primary lawmakers. In this new role agencies have created 
tools allowing them to take on a responsibility that administrative 
agencies arguably were not meant to take on. Executive 
preemption and big waiver are two tools that administrative 
agencies use. In many ways, both tools are indispensible in order 
for administrative agencies to go forth as lawmakers. 
II. THE HEADY DEBATE: ARE THESE THEORIES
CONSTITUTIONAL? 
A. FOR EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION
Those that argue for executive preemption do so because 
they also think executive preemption is ultimately good. For 
instance, Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld argue that, contrary to 
popular belief, executive preemption is actually more transparent 
than congressional action.70 Thus, executive preemption creates 
greater accountability than classic preemption, which in turn 
hews closer to the tenets of federalism.71 Galle and Seidenfeld 
point out that many arguments against executive preemption 
stress that agencies are less deliberative than Congress.72 These 
critics view deliberation as a procedural safeguard against over-
preemption and federal encroachment.73 But, Galle and 
Seidenfeld argue that evidence suggests that agencies, in fact, act 
more deliberatively than Congress as opposed to less deliberately 
and transparently.74 
Galle and Seidenfeld argue that legislators trade votes in 
order to get votes for other statutes.75 This infers that voting 
records are less than ideal for understanding where members of 
69. See Jonathan Weisman, In Congress, Gridlock and Harsh Consequences, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jul. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/us/politics/in-congress-gridlock-
and-harsh-consequences.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/JQG9-XGHF].  
70. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L. J. 1933, 
1939 (2008). 
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1936. 
73. See id. at 1946.
74. See id. at 1939. 
75. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1950.
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Congress stand on a given issue.76 Furthermore, they argue that 
the mechanisms by which Congress passes laws are hidden from 
the public.77 This can be seen from the fact that laws first go 
through committees, which may engage in significant horse-
trading. Committees thus disallow the public from understanding 
exactly how the law was passed.78 
In contrast, Galle and Seidenfeld argue that administrative 
agencies are more transparent on both points.79 They argue that 
agencies have a better combination of rules and procedures that 
encourage deliberation and transparency.80 At the base of this 
argument is the fact that agencies are controlled by procedures 
that open up its rulemaking process.81 The two most important 
controls, in their view, are the Executive Order passed by 
President Clinton and the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“NOPR”).82 The Executive Order requires that “every agency to 
include in the Unified Regulatory Agenda . . . [to provide] both a 
brief summary and contact information for ‘all regulations under 
development or review.’”83 And “[i]n the NOPR, the agency must 
reveal information on which it relied in formulating the proposed 
rule to ensure that the public has a meaningful opportunity to 
comment on the rule.”84 These rules and procedures lead Galle 
and Seidenfeld to conclude that agencies are significantly better 
forums for resolving issues of federalism than Congress.85 
B. AGAINST EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION
Just as proponents of executive preemption argue backwards 
from the conclusion that executive preemption is good, opponents 
argue backwards from the conclusion that executive preemption 
is bad. For instance, Ernest Young argues that executive 
preemption, in its current state, creates a constitutional problem 
76. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1950-51.
77. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1950-51.
78. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1951-52.
79. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1955-56. 
80. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1955-56.
81. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1955-56.
82. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1955-56.
83. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1955.
84. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1956. 
85. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1939. 
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in that it flies in the face of Rice.86 Rice holds that there is a 
presumption against preemption and that preemption must be 
found in a clear statement.87 Specifically, he argues that the 
Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state 
laws because Congress is bound by procedural safeguards to 
adequately check Congress from abusing its preemptive power.88 
In Young’s opinion, agencies have nowhere near the same 
amount of procedural checks on them as Congress has.89 This thus 
implies that agencies receive a lesser degree of preemptive power 
than Congress, namely the preemptive power afforded to agencies 
by Rice. 
Young’s position appears to be almost the opposite of Galle 
and Seidenfeld’s, which perhaps implies that he does not buy their 
argument that agencies are more deliberative than Congress.90 
One can see Young’s opinion of agency deference as to 
preemptive power in the way that he treats Chevron. Young 
advocates that when a direct conflict arises between Rice and 
Chevron, Rice’s presumption against preemption should 
prevail.91 He argues that the solution to over-preemption by 
agencies is the adoption of a modified test drawn from 
Skidmore.92 According to Young: 
A preemption-specific version of Skidmore might 
prescribe deference to the agency’s interpretation of federal 
law if: 
• the agency itself considered the Rice
presumption in the first instance, as required by
Executive Order 13,132;
• the agency’s analysis includes a “federalism
impact statement,” also required by the
Federalism Order, that is nonperfunctory;
• the preemption determination turns on the
existence of policy conflicts, which the agency
86. See Young, supra note 1, at 881-83. 
87. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1947); Young, supra
note 1, at 876-78. 
88. See Young, supra note 1, at 876-79. 
89. See Young, supra note 1, at 878.
90. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 70, at 1955-56. 
91. See Young, supra note 1, at 891-92. 
92. See Young, supra note 1, at 891-92. 
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may have special expertise in identifying, 
rather than on pure statutory construction; 
• state officials had prior notice that the agency
was considering a preemption finding, by
notice and comment or otherwise;
• the agency’s preemption finding includes a
limiting principle preserving meaningful areas
of state regulatory authority; and/or
• the agency in question has a moderate history—
that is, it sometimes finds against preemption
rather than always expanding its own authority
at the expense of the states.93
Roderick M. Hills, Jr. argues that adopting an anti-
preemption rule of statutory construction actually benefits the 
national lawmaking process.94 Hills’s argument uses the 
following hypothetical to illustrate why an anti-executive position 
encourages a more open democratic process.95 Let us assume that 
the federal government avoids legislating on politically sensitive 
issues. In fact, evidence shows that states are more apt to legislate 
on politically sensitive issues because their demographics are 
much less heterogeneous.96 Going forward from this, let us 
assume that states produce more divisive laws, which are unlikely 
to be preempted by the tamer body of federal law.97 Furthermore, 
let us say that a state passes a law that is detrimental to certain 
businesses. What should the businesses do? Certainly, if a pro-
preemption rule held, the businesses would lobby agencies to pass 
93. See Young, supra note 1, at 891–92. Unfortunately, Young’s position is slightly
undone by the fact that the current Supreme Court has seemingly no desire to make a 
complete return to a strict definition of Rice. In fact, many of the Court’s rulings almost 
appear to reinforce Chevron deference by limiting it. Two great examples of this would be 
Christensen v. Harrison County and United States v. Mead Corp., in which the Court 
together defined the principle that Chevron deference applies only when Congress delegates 
authority with the force of law. See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 577 (2000); 
U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001). In limiting Chevron, the current Court 
impliedly favors it. This is a reasonable and correct choice because the state of Congress 
today is not the same as the state of Congress in the 1940s when Rice and Skidmore were 
decided. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA L. 
REV. 953, 959-60 (2016). 
94. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (2007).  
95. See id. at 29-31. 
96. See id. at 29. 
97. See id. at 29-31. 
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a regulation that preempts the disfavored state law. In doing so, 
the businesses would have preempted a state law without having 
to go through any body responsible to the voters of the state in 
which the original law was passed. 
The above example demonstrates why Hills argues for a 
strict an anti-preemption view of statutory construction. In his 
view, anti-executive preemption means that the lawmaking 
process benefits from maintaining an open and deliberative 
process for creating federal preemptive power.98 
C. FOR BIG WAIVER
Proponents of big waiver tend to favor it because it seems to 
be a practical necessity in the age of legislative gridlock. For 
instance, Michael S. Greve and Ashley C. Parrish highlight that 
waiver, in many ways, must occur in two types of situations.99 
The first situation is where gridlock disallows Congress from 
repealing old statutes that inhibit agencies from creating a 
functioning regulatory framework.100 The second situation is 
where Congress has hyper-legislated, thus “exceed[ing] the 
bandwidth of administrative agencies.”101 
Greve and Parrish’s example of an old statute is the Clean 
Air Act viewed through Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA 
(“UARG”).102  In UARG, the EPA essentially rewrote part of the 
Clean Air Act to cover a large range of greenhouse gas emitters, 
including individual automobiles.103 The conflict in UARG was 
whether the EPA had rewritten part of a statutory provision that 
was unambiguous, thus violating Chevron.104 The Court held that 
98. See id. at 30-32. That being said, a strong anti-preemption rule may conflict with
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence. This is something that even Hills admits in his article 
when he discusses Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. See generally Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). According to Hills, after Geier, “the Court’s decisions have 
frequently honored Rice’s ‘initial assumption’ by abandoning it, finding an intent to preempt 
even without anything remotely like ‘clear and manifest’ evidence of such intent.” Hills, 
supra note 94, at 61-62. 
99. See Michael S. Greve & Ashely C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress,
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 504 (2015). 
100. See id. at 504. 
101. Id. at 505. 
102. Id. at 504 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)).
103. See id. at 2436–37. 
104. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 511.
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the EPA violated Chevron.105 But, it adopted a very narrow 
definition of the term “unambiguous.”106 According to Gary 
Lawson, the term “unambiguous” within the Chevron context can 
mean one of two things.107 The phrase can mean “unambiguous” 
in that “no sensible reader [could] understand this term (or phrase 
or sentence) to mean anything other than what it says.”108 
Alternatively, “unambiguous” can mean something closer to a 
certainty in that “we are confident of its meaning after we have 
deployed all ordinary canons of construction.”109 By invalidating 
the EPA regulation on the grounds that the statute could not be 
read in a way that validated the regulation the UARG Court 
missed an opportunity to restrain agency rewrites.110 As Greve 
and Parrish argue, this creates an opening for big waiver.111 
Greve and Parrish’s hyper-legislation example, on the other 
hand, is the Dodd-Frank Act.112 The Dodd-Frank Act was a major 
piece of legislation that brought about sweeping changes to the 
finance industry and the regulatory framework surrounding it.113 
According to Greve and Parrish, the Act was so broad that its 
requirements exceeded the bandwidth of the agencies charged 
with enforcing it.114 For instance, the Act required close to 400 
rulemakings to be completed within a tight timeframe.115 This 
requirement was never met because meeting it was impossible 
given agency budget restraints.116 What agencies ended up doing 
with many of the deadlines imposed by Dodd-Frank was to 
simply let them pass.117 In the alternative, the agencies prioritized 
proceedings according to the needs of constituencies.118 
In many ways what hyper-legislation does is force agencies 
to prioritize their resources into the parts of a statute with the most 
105. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 511–12.
106. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 640 (6th ed. 2013).
107. Id.
108. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 511.
109. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 511.
110. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 511-12.
111. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 512.
112. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 516-18.
113. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 516-18.
114. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 516-18.
115. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 505.
116. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 504-05.
117. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 523.
118. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 523.
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teeth.119 This forces agencies to look at the intent of the statute 
rather than seemingly clear mandates.120 As a backstop, agencies 
know that if they stray too far from the path, a court will invalidate 
their waivers or regulations as exceeding their delegated 
powers.121 
Barron and Rakoff support the hyper-legislation argument 
by stating that Congress, at present, legislates via highly detailed 
statutes coupled with waiver provisions.122 In doing so, Congress 
creates a first draft when it passes a statute.123 This first draft has 
everything Congress wants in the statute.124 But at the same time, 
Congress knows it cannot get everything that it wants.125 This is 
why Congress includes waiver provisions.126 Armed with a 
waiver provision, agencies choose which parts of the statute are 
workable and waive the rest.127 In many ways, this concept 
supports Greve and Parrish’s argument that courts favor big 
waiver over big delegation.128 Today’s Congress must legislate in 
a jungle of pre-existing law, lobbying, and extreme partisanship. 
As a result, Barron and Rakoff argue that the “power to unmake 
Congress’s law is approaching in significance the delegation of 
the power to make law on Congress’s behalf.”129 
D. AGAINST BIG WAIVER
Even if Barron and Rakoff are correct in saying that big 
waiver is the new normal for agencies in an era of hyper-
legislation,130 constitutional issues still arise. For instance, UARG 
is an example of an institutional problem with big waiver. As 
Greve and Parrish argue, “broad waiver authority may enable an 
agency to tailor its regulations so as to obviate congressional 
review and interventions. Barring judicial review, the agency may 
119. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 545.
120. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 516. 
121. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 503-04.
122. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 534. 
123. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 269.
124. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 269-70.
125. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 269.
126. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 269.
127. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 269.
128. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 511-12.
129. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 269.
130. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 267-71.
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be entirely on its own.”131 As Greve and Parrish argue, UARG 
involved a shell game in which the EPA attempted to justify its 
rewrite by rewriting other parts of the statute to make the main 
rewrite appear more constitutional.132 While the Court in UARG 
discovered the EPA’s shell game,133 one can foresee this not 
always being the case. One could foresee an agency engaging in 
an ambiguous rewrite that contravenes, in part, the statute’s 
original intent. This situation would be harder to invalidate 
because Chevron creates a space in which agencies may operate 
with significant deference.134 
This creates a problem in that the Supreme Court puts the 
burden on those affected by agency rewrites to challenge them.135 
While this may not seem particularly onerous, it is burdensome in 
that it forces those affected by rewrites to discover the rewrite in 
the first place.136 If one assumes that agencies have a knowledge 
advantage over non-agency parties as to their own regulatory 
framework, then what is to stop agencies from burying the rewrite 
in way that makes it non-discoverable? Furthermore, wouldn’t 
such an act be more likely if, like in UARG, the agencies’ rewrite 
raises Chevron issues? While in many ways, creating a more 
liberal interpretation of Chevron and big waiver advances what 
Barron and Rakoff call the new normal,137 it also creates 
significant federalism issues. As seen with UARG, we do not want 
to give agencies the power to rewrite or undo statutes in a way 
that Congress does not intend. Doing so takes these agency 
actions wholly outside of the democratic process.138 
131. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 539.
132. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 525-27.
133. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 504-05.
134. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 838-44
(1984). 
135. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 539-43.
136. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 539.
137. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 269.
138. Even if UARG justifies big waiver absent a statutory waiver provision in
Chevron-type situations, how can one justify temporary big waiver of the type in United 
States v. Texas? Under the INA, if one is found to be an illegal alien that person is placed in 
deportation proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012 & Supp. I 2018). Thus, how are DACA 
and DAPA justified, as they appear to do the opposite of what the INA requires by giving 
those covered under the programs temporary legal status? In many ways temporary big 
waiver raises the exact type of concerns put forth by Richard Epstein in opposition to big 
waiver.  Richard A. Epstein, Gov’t by Waiver, 37 NAT’L AFFAIRS 39 (Spring 2011), 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/government-by-waiver 
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Another problem with big waiver is that it essentially allows 
legislators to lie to their constituents. According to Greve and 
Parrish, hyper-legislation is meant to accommodate “an 
entrenched lobbying culture, and deep partisan division.”139 
Along with these accommodations, legislators can include waiver 
provisions to undo many of the accommodations so that the 
agency can actually enforce the statute.140 Thus, hyper-legislation 
allows legislators to plausibly satisfy the forces of lobbying 
culture and partisan division while at the same time satisfying 
agencies by supplying them with a workable statute. But, this 
scenario raises some serious issues if we are to maintain a 
democratic system. If this is the situation that hyper-legislation 
creates, perhaps we should ask ourselves if it is a good thing to let 
legislators say one thing and do another. More succinctly, should 
we let legislators get around legislative gridlock by creating 
administrative workarounds (such as waiver provisions) instead 
of addressing the elements of our political process that got us to 
gridlock in the first place? 
This is not a question that this paper in any way seeks to 
answer. But the previous paragraph raises serious questions about 
whether the concept of hyper-legislation, paired with big waiver, 
is in line with our democratic process. How transparent do we 
want our democratic process to be? More to the point, does hyper-
legislation, paired with big waiver, completely obliterate the 
argument that Congress is more deliberative than agencies? In 
many ways, part of the deliberate-ness argument is premised on 
[https://perma.cc/S2CY-B5EU].  According to Epstein, one of the main problems with big 
waiver is that it’s highly prone to capricious application. See id. at 40-41. Epstein highlights 
the ACA’s “mini-med” plan, which deals with employers offering part-time workers a form 
of basic coverage so that these workers are not left uninsured. See id. at 51-52. One issue 
with the “mini-med” plans was that large employers, with high turnover rates for part-time 
workers, could potentially be overly burdened by such a requirement. See id. In response to 
this issue, the Department of Health and Human Services allowed employers to apply for a 
waiver to the “mini-med” requirement, eventually granting over 1,000 waivers. See id. But, 
as Epstein points out, “what about employers who do not have the resources to navigate the 
waiver process? What about those lacking the political connections to make their concerns 
heard in Washington?” See id. at 52.  In this regard, big waiver becomes a further wedge 
between the haves and the have nots. See id. Although Epstein’s argument against big waiver 
extends to the concept of waiver in general, his point on big waiver resonates strongly. See 
id. If the “mini-med” situation creates a wedge between the haves and the have-nots, is this 
a desirable outcome in a democracy meant to represent persons equally? 
139. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 535.
140. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 535.
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the idea that Congress makes hard choices about what to include 
in statutes. If Congress simply throws everything into the kitchen 
pot and leaves it to agencies to fix Congress’ first draft, Congress 
is not acting deliberately. Instead, Congress is appeasing in a 
blanket manner. This raises a lot of questions as to whether our 
democratic system should allow legislators to prioritize reelection 
over legislating. If the answer is no, then big waiver should be 
significantly paired back in order to disincentivize Congress from 
engaging in hyper-legislation. 
III. THE CONVERGENCE OF THE TWAIN:
ADMINISTRATIVE BALANCE 
In many ways, Part II outlines reasons to be both excited and 
wary of executive preemption and big waiver. One possible 
solution could be to address the issues with these theories on their 
own, thus addressing these theories one by one. But, what if the 
downsides to these theories could be addressed without novel 
argument? What if, instead, the downsides to each theory could 
be redefined as merely de minimis and thus not warranting 
address? This paper positions itself as an answer to the latter 
question. By looking at executive preemption and big waiver in 
tandem, as two sides of the same coin, each theory reinforces each 
other and allays their respective concerns. 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BALANCE 
Think of each theory broadly. Executive preemption can be 
thought of as restricting the rights of states to create their own 
laws by expanding the preemptive effect of federal statutes. Big 
waiver can be thought of as expanding the rights of states to create 
their own laws by shrinking the preemptive effect of federal 
statutes. Theoretically, each theory could thus be seen as mutually 
enforcing. They create a situation in which states sometimes win 
(by getting more rights via big waiver) and sometimes lose (by 
getting less rights via executive preemption). This paper defines 
this principle as “administrative balance.” Looking further into 
administrative balance, one could even see it take place within the 
same statute. Take, for instance, Dodd-Frank and the INA through 
the lens of DACA and DAPA. 
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As previously mentioned in this paper, Dodd-Frank requires 
its agencies to create over 400 new rulemakings.141 These 
rulemakings all possess explicit preemptive effect, even by Rice’s 
definition.142 Dodd-Frank, then, exemplifies hyper-legislation’s 
ability to create broad executive preemption. 
That being said, Dodd-Frank’s rulemaking requirements 
were generally accompanied by tight implementation deadlines, 
resulting in holdups to the rulemaking process because the sheer 
mass of the requirement exceeded the bandwidth of the agencies, 
given the deadlines.143 In response to this problem, the applicable 
agencies waived certain rulemaking requirements by letting the 
deadlines pass, declining to preempt state law to the full extent 
allowed by the statute.144 These waivers thus exemplify the idea 
that agencies generally decline to exercise the degree to which 
hyper-legislation empowers them to preempt.145 In this regard, 
hyper-legislation can be said to require administrative balance, as 
agencies take the “first draft” of a statute and shape it into a 
workable framework. 
A further and subtler example of administrative balance 
existing within one statute can be seen in the INA through the lens 
of DAPA and DACA. As this paper has previously argued, DAPA 
and DACA constitute a form of temporary waiver, effected absent 
a statutory provision.146 That being said, these programs contain 
implicit authorization to engage in executive preemption insofar 
as they require Texas to afford qualifying aliens a form of 
temporary legal status under Texas’s laws.147 This status affects 
both Texas’ previous standards for issuing driver’s licenses to 
illegal aliens as well as its ability to control these immigrants’ 
entry into the labor market.148 In this regard, DAPA and DACA 
141. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 505.
142. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947); Greve &
Parrish, supra note 99, at 504-05. 
143. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 504-05.
144. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 523.
145. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 523.
146. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 660 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing
DAPA, which this paper argues is a form of temporary big waiver). 
147. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 616-17 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
148. See id.
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take the INA, a quintessentially national law, and extend it into a 
state’s legal corpus further than the INA allows on its face.149 
DAPA and DACA take the form of a more modern executive 
preemption than the kind found in Dodd-Frank because modern 
executive preemption assumes an absence of a clear statement.150 
Thus, even though Dodd-Frank clearly pertains to executive 
preemption, DAPA and DACA extends our understanding of this 
concept.151 
149. See id. at 627; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (discussing the base requirements
for enforcement of the INA). 
150. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). 
151. Interestingly, DAPA could be a great example of modern executive preemption
benefitting federalism. To understand this point, take a look at how Texas asserted standing 
(i.e. how it alleged harm) and how its assertion misunderstands the preemptive effect of these 
theories. In the original district court case, Texas filed suit to enforce the INA under a parens 
patriae theory. See Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 625.  The parens patriae doctrine holds that a 
state may file a lawsuit on behalf of one of its citizens, often to enforce a right granted to that 
citizen by a federal statute. See Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); 
Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 626. For instance, a private citizen may be barred from filing a suit 
on standing grounds, but a state may be free to file suit under a parens patriae theory. See 
Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra; Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 626. While the 
parens patriae doctrine still requires a state to prove some sovereign interest to have standing 
to sue, Texas alleged in this suit that DAPA and DACA infringed on their economic and 
property interests. See Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 626-27. Specifically, Texas argued that it 
retained a valid quasi-sovereign interest in “the health and well-being—both physical and 
economic—of its residents,” which allowed a valid parens patriae claim. Id. at 627 (quoting 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. P.R., 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). Specifically, Texas “allege[d] 
that the DHS Directive will create a discriminatory employment environment that will 
encourage employers to hire DAPA beneficiaries instead of those with lawful permanent 
status in the United States.” Id. at 627. According to Texas, DAPA creates this harm by 
requiring Texas to give those under DAPA driver’s licenses, which would allow them to seek 
forms of lawful employment they were previously foreclosed from obtaining. See id. at 616, 
618-19 (stating that Texas had not allowed illegal aliens to obtain driver’s licenses without 
proving, at least, some valid employment permit). In some ways, DAPA and DACA’s 
preemptive effect creates a harm in that it inhibits Texas’ lawmaking power in this arena. It 
also puts thousands of previously unemployable persons into Texas’ job market, which 
increases the unemployment rate and the competitiveness of the Texas job market. 
Additionally, it forces Texas to bear any additional costs of issuing driver’s licenses to aliens 
covered under these programs over the $24 aliens must pay to obtain a driver’s license. See 
Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 617. But, at the same time, one could foresee some serious benefits 
to Texas that could counteract any possible harms in might incur. For instance, Texas could 
see initial revenue from additional taxes brought on by these programs. According to a 2013 
study by the Heritage Foundation, “[m]ost analysts assume that roughly half of unlawful 
immigrants work ‘off the books’ and therefore do not pay income or FICA taxes. During the 
interim phase, these ‘off the books’ workers would have a strong incentive to move to ‘on 
the books’ employment.” ROBERT RECTOR & JASON RICHWINE, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 
THE FISCAL COST OF UNLAWFUL IMMIGRANTS AND AMNESTY TO THE U.S. TAXPAYER, at 
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Concurrently, DAPA and DACA may also constitute a form 
of waiver by allowing Texas law enforcement to engage in an 
omission by not having to report illegal aliens to DHS.152 Under 
the INA previous to DAPA and DACA any alien found to be 
illegal was to be brought to the attention of the DHS.153 This puts 
a strain, if only a small one, on local law enforcement to act in 
tandem with DHS’s police in order to round up illegal aliens. But, 
DAPA and DACA alleviate this strain by allowing local 
enforcement in Texas to omit reporting illegal aliens covered 
under DAPA and DACA.154 This freedom to engage in an 
omission allows local law enforcement to divert whatever 
resources would have been committed to reporting illegal aliens 
into other endeavors. As such, this omission ability constitutes a 
waiver in that it gives states the ability to reallot money in a way 
previously disallowed under the INA.155 
In regard to both Dodd-Frank and the INA, what can be seen 
is that both modern legislation and modern agency enforcement 
already show instances of administrative balance. In many ways, 
the hyper-legislation theorized by Greve and Parrish156 requires 
vi (May 6, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/05/the-fiscal-cost-of-
unlawful-immigrants-and-amnesty-to-the-us-taxpayer [https://perma.cc/CDU7-VWQL]. 
This is huge considering that, in 2010, the average household of illegal aliens received 
$24,721 in government benefits while only paying $10,344 in taxes. See id. at 13, 16. If 
anything, the monetary deficit of having illegal aliens with no form of legal status could be 
erased in the short term. See id. at vi-vii, 13. This is particularly important considering the 
fact that Texas alleged that DAPA and DACA would harm their citizens’ competitiveness in 
the job market. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 627. Realistically, this is a short-term problem in 
and of itself because added human capacity necessarily equates, long-term, to higher 
unemployment. See RECTOR & RICHWINE, supra, at 24-25. Thus, the short-term solution 
forecast by the Heritage Foundation study could create balance by introducing a short-term 
solution to a short-term problem. See RECTOR & RICHWINE, supra, vi-vii. That being said, 
the same study found that amnesty for illegal immigrants would likely create a net deficit in 
the long-term. But, the same study tempered its conclusion by noting that many citizens 
produce a net deficit to the economy over the same period of time. See RECTOR & RICHWINE, 
supra, at 10-13.  
152. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (Supp. IV 2017). 
153. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).
154. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (Supp. IV 2017); Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came 
to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Whose Parents are 




156. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 502.
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administrative balance. Without administrative balance a piece of 
hyper-legislation would be almost unworkable from an 
enforcement perspective. Moreover, Greve and Parrish’s old 
statute scenario157 may also be unworkable without 
administrative balance. This is because keeping old statutes 
current and aligned with their original intent involves both 
ratcheting up and ratcheting down certain elements of the statute. 
Agencies do this by promulgating new regulations or by 
temporarily waiving statutory requirements. 
The hyper-legislation and old statute theories put forth by 
Greve and Parrish both showcase the underlying existence of 
administrative balance. For these theories to be true, 
administrative balance must also be true. Without the assumption 
of administrative balance’s existence, both theories cannot 
reconcile themselves with how these statutes play out in practice. 
B. RECONCILING THE SCHOLARSHIP
A key to adopting administrative balance is that it reconciles, 
to an extent, the problems scholars find with executive 
preemption and big waiver. While the arguments against these 
theories raise legitimate concerns about these theories’ continued 
use, they ultimately fail to understand two things. First, these 
arguments misunderstand the current state of administrative law 
given the gridlocked state of Congress. Secondly, the way in 
which these arguments predict the effects of executive 
preemption and big waiver is fundamentally wrong because these 
arguments think of these theories as separate ideas. 
1. THE MISPLACED ARGUMENT AGAINST
EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION 
Addressing Young, Young argues that executive 
preemption, in its current state, creates a constitutional issue in 
that it seems to fly in the face of Rice.158 But, the way to reconcile 
this problem is to look at where the Court is, currently, in its 
preemption jurisprudence and the way that the Court looks at 
preemption today. The Court has truly deviated from Rice in its 
157. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 502.
158. See Young, supra note 1, at 881-83; supra Part II(B).
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jurisprudence.159 Instead, it appears that the Court oftentimes 
starts from Chevron and then, if at all, looks to Rice after its 
Chevron analysis is completed.160 Young argues that the Court’s 
mode of analysis is flawed (or at least incorrect).161 Instead, 
Young advocates for a return to Rice and a strict view of agency 
preemption.162 Young advances his argument by putting forth a 
modified Skidmore test, which he thinks honors Rice and the 
concept of federalism as a whole.163 
But Young’s own view is flawed. The fact is that the state of 
administrative law, at the time that Rice and Skidmore were 
decided, was very different from the state of administrative law 
today.164 Thus, one could argue that reverting to Rice would 
actually be more detrimental to the administrative state and 
federalism generally. Rice does not account for the things that 
agencies do in the face of incredible legislative gridlock.165 On 
the other hand, administrative balance does. Administrative 
balance is premised on the fact that executive preemption and big 
waiver create a situation in which states sometimes get more 
power and sometimes get less power. This win/lose principle is 
not legal fiction—it is a practical reality. 
2. THE MISPLACED ARGUMENT AGAINST BIG
WAIVER 
Greve and Parrish hold up the EPA in UARG as an example 
of an agency abusing its discretion.166 In their opinion, UARG’s 
EPA is the classic “bad actor” that uses its knowledge of its own 
regulatory framework to obscure its intentions and push its 
agenda.167 Furthermore, Texas v. United States highlights another 
risk within big waiver, namely that of burden shifting.168 
Although it is natural for those harmed by big waiver to bear the 
burden of proving the harm, most likely these plaintiffs are at an 
159. See Hills, supra note 94, at 61.
160. See Young, supra note 1, at 884. 
161. See Young, supra note 1, at 891. 
162. See Young, supra note 1, at 891.
163. See Young, supra note 1, at 891-92. 
164. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 530.
165. See Young, supra note 1, at 882. 
166. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 526-27.
167. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 526.
168. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 750 (5th Cir. 2015).
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information disadvantage.169 As stated before in this paper, what 
is to stop agencies from using their informational advantage to 
bury evidence of its improper rewrites? Interestingly, the answer 
to these issues could be that the questions these issues raise are 
the wrong questions to be asking. Put another way, perhaps these 
questions are misdirected. Perhaps UARG’s EPA was not a bad 
actor at all, but instead a hapless warrior trying to do the best it 
could in a terrible situation. As to UARG and Texas v. United 
States, these broad rewrite situations can almost distract one from 
the events leading up to the agency policies in the first place. The 
reason that the EPA and the DOJ acted in the way that they did 
was because of extreme problems in the statutes that they were 
charged with enforcing.170 
UARG dealt with the Clean Air Act.171 As Greve and Parrish 
wrote, “UARG has its history in a long record of futile efforts, 
dating back two decades, to enact comprehensive climate change 
legislation. Congress often considered legislation; however, it 
never took affirmative action to regulation greenhouse gas 
emissions.”172 Ultimately, advocacy groups petitioned the EPA to 
regulate greenhouse gases, which it resisted doing, arguing that it 
lacked authority.173 However, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court 
held that greenhouses gases were unambiguously included in the 
Clean Air Act.174 Though the Court did not require the EPA to 
regulate greenhouses gases de jure, many read the ruling to 
require the regulation de facto.175 Unfortunately, the Clean Air 
Act’s architecture did not give the EPA any real ability to regulate 
greenhouse gases.176 This created a situation in which the EPA 
had no choice but to rewrite parts of the Clean Air Act.177 Thus, 
one could look at UARG not as a story of an agency run amuck, 
but instead as one trying to do the best it can in the worst of 
circumstances. 
169. See id.
170. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 506-08.
171. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. at 2424.
172. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 506.
173. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 506.
174. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007); Greve & Parrish, supra
note 99, at 506. 
175. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 506.
176. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 506.
177. Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 506.
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With DAPA and DACA, the DOJ was in relatively the same 
situation with the INA as the EPA was with the Clean Air Act. 
Congress had, for years, tried to address the fact that there are 
millions of illegal immigrants in this country that the DHS has no 
resources to deport and no legal avenue to grant status.178 
Furthermore, the INA directs the DHS to prioritize prosecuting 
illegal immigrants with criminal records.179 But, more and more 
illegal immigrants enter this country by the day, packing the 
immigration courts’ dockets to the brim and draining the 
resources of the DOJ and DHS.180 This makes it exceedingly hard 
to process illegal immigrants with criminal records.181 In response 
to this ever-growing problem, the DOJ created DAPA and DACA 
partially in order to free up its immigration courts and the 
resources it tied to those courts.182 Interestingly, these additional 
resources can be diverted to more closely adhering to the INA by 
devoting further resources to prosecuting illegal aliens with 
criminal records.183 Thus, one can look at the temporary waiver 
in Texas v. United States not as an unconstitutional act, but as a 
desperate attempt to stop the bleeding. 
3. ADMINISTRATIVE BALANCE AND THE DE
MINIMIS RENDERING 
Parts III(B)(1–2) of this paper argue that opponents of 
executive preemption and big waiver misunderstand the current 
state of administrative law relative a gridlocked Congress in the 
context of these theories.184 But, what if these opponents did 
178. See Nowrasteh, supra note 54.
179. See Exec. Order No. 13,768 82 C.F.R. § 18 (Jan. 30, 2017).
180. See Muzaffar Chishti & Michelle Mittelstadt, UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS
WITH CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: WHO MIGHT BE A PRIORITY FOR REMOVAL?, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (Nov. 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/unauthorized-immigrants-
criminal-convictions-who-might-be-priority-removal [https://perma.cc/4ENX-QKDS]. 
181. See Jeh Charles Johnson, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discreti
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3RB-64FM]. 
182. See Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson Concerning the District Court’s Ruling




184. See supra Parts III(B)(1–2).
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understand the current state of administrative law? Would their 
arguments against these theories stand of firmer footing? The 
answer is likely no. These opponents argue against these theories 
by, in part, forecasting the effect of these theories in practical 
application.185 But, to argue these theories separately 
fundamentally misunderstands how these theories effect 
administrative law as a whole. 
As seen in Dodd-Frank and the INA, executive preemption 
and big waiver can exist in tandem with each other.186 Without 
viewing these theories through the lens of administrative balance 
one cannot get an accurate picture as to how these theories are 
playing out in reality. What if one only looked at Dodd-Frank 
from an executive preemption perspective? By doing so, one 
might predict agency overreach as they execute their broad 
authority to write regulations for 400 components of the statute.187 
But, when viewing Dodd-Frank through administrative balance 
one gets a very different picture. Instead of an overreaching 
agency one sees a pragmatic agency. One sees an agency 
overloaded by the enormous requirements of Dodd-Frank’s 
rulemakings. 
Furthermore, one sees an agency distilling the requirements 
to the most important of the bunch, separating the wheat from the 
chafe. Additionally, what if one only looked at DAPA and DACA 
from a big waiver perspective? By doing so, one might predict an 
agency shirking its duties as to hundreds of thousands of illegal 
aliens. But, when viewing the INA through administrative 
balance the picture changes. Instead of a capricious agency one 
sees a desperate agency. One sees an agency requiring states to 
recognize aliens as legal residents. One might see this preemption 
as enacted in order to carry out the stronger requirements of the 
INA, namely the deportation of illegal aliens with criminal 
records. 
It is not that opponents to executive preemption and big 
waiver are wrong to argue that, in some cases, these theories 
negatively impact the concept of federalism.188 This paper argues 
instead that these arguments are fundamentally misguided 
185. See supra Parts III(B)(1–2).
186. See supra Part III(A).
187. See supra Part II(B); Young, supra note 1, at 869-80. 
188. See supra Part II; Young, supra note 1, at 869-80. 
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because they fail to view these theories through administrative 
balance. As such, they fail to recognize that administrative 
balance may, at times, render the harm caused by one theory on 
its own de minimis when viewed through administrative balance. 
IV. THE NEW FRONTIER: ADMINISTRATIVE
BALANCE AND MODERN FEDERALISM
For the world is changing. The old era is ending. The old 
ways will not do. 
– John F. Kennedy189
A. A TOOL FOR ADAPTATION
Even if it is true that administrative balance already occurs, 
this would not matter if administrative balance were a bad thing. 
Clearly it matters less that administrative balance is provable than 
that administrative balance is good. Fortunately, administrative 
balance is good. It is good because administrative balance is, at 
its heart, a tool for adaptation. 
Administrative balance allows agencies, and the federal 
statutes they enforce, to adapt to the times in a way that they could 
not without administrative balance. It allows federal agencies to 
revise old statutes in light of new statutes. This allows those old 
statutes to maintain their purpose and effectiveness in light of 
changing times. Administrative balance also allows agencies to 
tailor new statutes for the future. The waiver provisions in hyper-
legislated statutes like the ACA allow agencies to tailor these 
statutes into a workable framework. This tailoring ensures the 
effectiveness of the statutes like the ACA and cements their 
purpose for the times that lie ahead. 
Consider how administrative balance benefits federalism in 
regard to old statutes. Modern immigration law is based on the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act passed in 1965.190 
Throughout the years, the INA adapted passing Congress passing 
189. “The New Frontier,” acceptance speech of Senator John F. Kennedy,
Democratic National Convention, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND 
MUSEUM (July 15, 1960), https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKSEN-
0910-015.aspx [https://perma.cc/B2KX-2F4F]. 
190. See U.S. Immigration Since 1965, History.com (Mar. 5, 2010),
http://www.history.com/topics/us-immigration-since-1965 [https://perma.cc/H74B-6YXH]. 
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small revisions.191 Accordingly, the DOJ has promulgated 
differing regulations over the years in order to enforce the INA. 
These regulations have preemptive effect by way of Chevron.192 
But, Congress’s revisions assumedly rendered some of the DOJ’s 
initial regulations ineffective.193 Additionally, the DOJ may have 
added new regulations to adapt to the changing state of 
immigration in our country.194 As such, over the years the DOJ 
has utilized administrative balance in order to maintain a 
workable immigration system in light of changing societal 
attitudes and congressional action. Even though most waivers 
amounted simply to waiving regulations,195 the DOJ’s recent 
actions display the full breadth of waiver in DAPA and DACA. 
Thus, congressional gridlock has expanded the possibilities of 
administrative balance. 
But, the goal is the same. The DOJ utilizes administrative 
gridlock to create a workable system.196 Remember, the INA is a 
quintessentially national statute. Its requirements, both statutory 
and regulatory, preempt state law as far as the DOJ deems 
necessary within the bounds of the law.197 Thus, the DOJ’s 
commitment to maintaining a workable immigration system via 
administrative balance does two things, both benefitting 
federalism. The DOJ’s use of administrative balance ensures that 
it has the tools to implement the INA to the most efficient extent 
possible. Concurrently, administrative balance upholds the DOJ’s 
implied commitment to the states to provide them with a workable 
immigration system to be carried out by federal officials. 
Consider how administrative balance benefits federalism in 
regard to new statutes in the form of hyper-legislation. Hyper-
legislation assumes subsequent agency waiver to convert the 
“first draft” that Congress passes into a workable statute for 
enforcement purposes.198 These statutes do so by inserting waiver 
191. See id.
192. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840-45
(1984). 
193. See Federal Policy on DACA and DAPA, 2017-2020, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Federal_policy_on_DACA_and_DAPA,_2017-2020 
[https://perma.cc/MY23-DLNU] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
194. See supra Part I(B).
195. See supra Part I(B).
196. See DHS.GOV, supra note 182.
197. See DHS.GOV, supra note 182.
198. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 269.
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provisions into the statutes for later agency use.199 As outlined in 
Part III(A), hyper-legislation creates a preemptive ceiling in a 
given statute’s full preemptive extent (along with any further 
Chevron-type regulations).200 Concurrently, hyper-legislation 
permanently inserts waiver provisions, allowing agencies to tailor 
the statute for future application.201 
Looking at the ACA, one can see administrative balance 
aiding agencies to accomplish the ACA’s ultimate goal—
universal health care.202 Agencies can waive provisions as to 
exchanges and individual mandates in order to help citizens of 
different states obtain a base line of coverage.203 But, agencies 
can also reassert their full preemptive powers, along with install 
further Chevron-style regulations, if these agencies find states 
uncooperative in the future.204 Thus, the agencies’ use of 
administrative balance in the ACA benefits federalism two ways. 
It recognizes that different states have different baselines of 
healthcare infrastructure.205 Waivers facilitate state involvement 
in setting up health care exchanges and promote state 
independence by giving them a voice in deciding how to effect 
the ACA in their state.206 Furthermore, administrative balance 
benefits federalism by allowing agencies to flex their preemptive 
muscles if states attempt to impede the ACA’s implementation. 
B. A TOOL OF MINIMAL CONCERN
A further benefit of administrative balance is that it is a tool 
of minimal concern. While concerns arise about validating the 
type of plus and minus system that administrative balance 
outlines, these concerns are likely overplayed. 
For example, some may worry that viewing executive 
preemption and big waiver through administrative balance may 
empower agencies to over-preempt or over-waive.207 This paper 
argues that such a concern is misguided. Regarding over-
199. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 266-69.
200. See supra Part III(A).
201. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 266-69.
202. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 281-83.
203. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 281-83.
204. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 279-81.
205. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 281-83.
206. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 281-83.
207. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 39-41; Young, supra note 1, at 869-80. 
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preemption, such a concern assumes that agencies have the 
monetary power to actually carry out such expansive preemptive 
action. In reality, many agencies are underfunded.208 Agencies 
simply do not have the money to over-preempt because they 
would not be able to enforce their preemptive action. 
Agencies are also unlikely to over-waive. Courts are much 
stricter on agency waiver than on agency preemption.209 Though 
the ACA and NCLB have resulted in much agency waiver, those 
waiver provisions were explicitly included in the statute.210 On 
the other hand, a court would likely invalidate any waiver or 
rewrite that in any way resembled UARG.211 Big waiver is not like 
executive preemption. Courts have never given agencies even 
close to as long a leash on big waiver as they’ve given agencies 
on executive preemption.212 
Additional concerns arise not from the idea of over-
preemption or over-waiver but from administrative balance itself. 
For instance, Richard Epstein argues that something akin to 
administrative balance raises significant risks for arbitrary and 
capricious application.213 According to Epstein, administrative 
balance risks a situation where “[i]n some cases, special benefits 
or permissions releasing companies from government regulations 
will simply be granted. In others, the releases will be provided 
only if the regulated parties agree to waive some legal protection 
to which they would otherwise be entitled.”214 In this regard, 
208. See Charlie Osborne, Lack of Funding Exposes US Federal Agencies to High
Data Breach Risks, ZDNet (Feb. 22, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-
suffers-highest-data-breaches-of-government-agencies-worldwide [https://perma.cc/FNZ8-
6GCG] (discussing lack of funding for cybersecurity efforts). 
209. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 626 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
210. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 2, at 281-82, 279.
211. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 511.
212. See Greve & Parrish, supra note 99, at 511.
213. Epstein doesn’t mention the term administrative balance in his scholarship, but
what he discusses as to this issue amounts to administrative scholarship. Essentially, Epstein 
discusses the risks arising in hyper-legislation-type statutes where agencies receive carte 
blanche in the form of broad preemptive and waiver powers. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 
39-40. As such, this paper will treat Epstein’s scholarship as a challenge to administrative 
balance. 
214. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 40. Epstein cites Dodd-Frank as a clear example
of how hyper-legislation of the kind Greve and Parrish discuss afford agencies incredible 
discretion. See Epstein, supra note 138, 52-53. Consider Epstein’s example of how, in his 
view, Dodd-Frank gives carte blanche to administrative agencies: 
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Epstein views something like administrative balance as agency 
carte blanche to act as primary lawmakers.215 But, perhaps 
Epstein’s concerns are overblown. Epstein worries that 
administrative balance creates further wedges between the haves 
and the have nots by giving special releases to large companies 
while leaving small companies by the wayside.216 But, Epstein 
does not relate how this action goes any further than what 
Congress already does. Epstein asserts no evidence that agencies 
are more amendable to lobbying than Congress.217 As such, his 
concern over agency discretion seems overblown as to how this 
discretion would produce more deleterious effects on our 
democracy than congressional lobbying. In regard to federalism, 
Epstein’s concern is even more overblown. The chance that one 
state will more effectively lobby an agency compared to another 
state has almost no evidence in Epstein’s work.218 Thus, the idea 
that administrative balance raises federalism concerns as to 
disparate application is almost a non-concern. 
Epstein also worries that administrative balance creates 
situations in which agencies will preempt state law in order to 
exact concessions in return for waivers.219 The basis for this 
concern is that judicial review is often slow and deferential to 
agency enforcement decisions.220 According to Epstein, “most 
Consider, for example, the process the law uses to establish whether a given 
financial institution creates a systemic financial risk — a risk that in turn 
justifies some form of government takeover. In the language of the statute, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is empowered to “determine that such 
action is necessary for purposes of the financial stability of the United States” 
— a stunningly broad determination, the terms of which are nowhere clearly 
defined. If the FDIC does make such a determination about a firm, it can inject 
into the company funds drawn from a new “orderly liquidation fund” created 
from fees assessed from all regulated financial firms. The amounts of these 
assessments are not fixed by the law, or applied universally across all financial 
institutions: Rather, they are to be determined based on the regulator’s 
judgment of such factors as “economic conditions generally affecting financial 
companies,” “the risks presented by the financial company to the financial 
system,” and, of course, “other risk-related factors as the [regulator] may 
determine to be appropriate.”  
Id. 
215. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 50.
216. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 51-52.
217. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 51-52.
218. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 138.
219. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 48-49.
220. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 53.
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private parties are not foolhardy enough to challenge a 
government regulator—they fear, understandably, that the 
government will retaliate elsewhere.”221 In regard to federalism, 
this concern seems overblown. To analogize this concern to states 
would be to assume that states act like corporations in regard to 
challenging agency actions.222 Furthermore, this concern assumes 
that agencies would preference an acrimonious relationship with 
states over a harmonizing one. According to Jessica Bulman-
Pozen and Heather Gerken, agencies depend on states to 
administer their programs.223 In summing up a study by Daniel 
Elazar, they state that “because federal authorities rely on the 
states to achieve their policy goals, they listen to the concerns of 
the state officials and ‘are prepared to make concessions to their 
state counterparts.’”224 Or, as Larry Kramer analogized it, 
“[[w]]hatever a boss’s formal power may be, there are always 
significant limits on his or her practical authority. Only a very bad 
manager fails to consider the needs and interests of subordinates 
or to consult them before making significant policy changes.”225 
In this regard, Epstein’s second concern that administrative 
balance may encourage agency bullying226 is not a particular 
concern for states given how agencies and states engage with each 
other. 
C. A TOOL FOR DEALS
When looking at how administrative balance benefits 
federalism it is important to step back and ask what federalism 
truly is. The traditional definition of federalism is the distribution 
of power between the federal and state governments.227 But how 
does that distribution of power get effected? Obviously, part of 
221. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 53.
222. In fact, Epstein himself appears to argue against this view by stating that
nonprofits are much more likely to challenge agency action than for-profit corporations. See 
id. States would appear to go even farther than nonprofits in their concern for business 
interests. If anything, states would be more apt to challenge agency abuse in order to protect 
their rights. 
223. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1266-67 (2009). 
224. Id. at 1266. 
225. Id. at 1267 (quoting Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1485, 1544 (1994)). 
226. See Epstein, supra note 138, at 48-49.
227. See Federalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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the distribution occurs through clear legal mandates, the 
Supremacy Clause being an example of such.228 But at the same 
time, this distribution also occurs via compromise and 
negotiation.229 In this regard, the federal and state governments 
sit at a metaphorical negotiating table. At this table, they negotiate 
over the distribution of power between them in order to 
implement their respective agendas. 
If the negotiating table metaphor is true, then what is the 
effect of legislative gridlock on those negotiations? If Congress, 
in light of gridlock, cannot legislate, one could infer that Congress 
cannot negotiate as well. Thus, to adopt a traditional definition of 
federalism is to adopt the view that the parties sitting at the 
negotiating table are not negotiating. But, what if federalism was 
not bound by the traditional definition of it being between 
Congress and the states? If modern federalism is something 
different than its traditional definition, then perhaps 
administrative balance becomes an important aspect of this 
modern definition. This paper argues that modern federalism is 
not defined by the traditional relationship of it being between 
Congress and the states. As such, administrative balance 
promotes modern federalism because it recognizes that modern 
federalism is not defined by its traditional relationship.230 Instead, 
modern federalism is a relationship between agencies and the 
states.231 
If modern federalism is defined by the agency-state 
relationship, should not states prefer to sit at the negotiating table 
with agencies as opposed to Congress? The negotiating table 
228. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
229. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 223, at 1266-67. 
230. “Traditional relationship” being the relationship between Congress and the states.
231. According to Bulman-Pozen, modern federalism is already defined as such,
taking the form of what she calls “executive federalism.” See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 93, 
at 953-55. Bulman-Pozen describes executive federalism closely to what this paper refers to 
as the negotiating table metaphor, in which agencies and states negotiate compromises with 
each other over major pieces of legislation. See id. at 954-55. Holding out the ACA as an 
example, Bulman-Pozen writes that the ACA’s waiver provision has allowed agencies and 
states to negotiate implementation after the Supreme Court invalidated required Medicaid 
expansion. See id. at 976-78; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012). According to Bulman-Pozen, “[t]he states have not always gotten what they want; 
the federal executive has rejected proposals for partial Medicaid expansion, among others. 
But notwithstanding the hierarchy baked into the statute, political considerations and federal 
reliance on state implementation have yielded a range of compromises.” Bulman-Pozen, 
supra note 93, at 977. 
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metaphor assumes that the distribution of power between the 
federal and state governments occurs via a certain degree of horse 
trading. As such, it benefits states to horse trade with an 
amendable body (i.e. a body that can actually horse trade). In this 
regard, administrative balance provides agencies the necessary 
tools to sit at the negotiating table and actually negotiate. As 
previously mentioned in this paper, statutes like the ACA and 
Dodd-Frank involved a negotiating process between agencies and 
the states in order to effect the statutes.232 This negotiating 
process was accomplished through administrative balance. By 
formally viewing the negotiating process of modern federalism 
though the lens of administrative balance both agencies and the 
states benefit because they can understand exactly how they’re 
negotiating. 
Furthermore, administrative balance promotes the idea that 
the negotiating process between agencies and states is not 
inherently acrimonious. Instead, modern federalism is a 
relationship of mutual dependency.233 According to Bulman-
Pozen and Gerken, the fact that agencies rely on states to help 
administer their programs creates a situation in which agencies 
are dependent on states.234 At the same time, states know that 
agencies have leverage over the states in that the federal 
government can always administer its programs itself.235 As such, 
states are dependent on agencies in regard to state independence 
and control over how federal programs affect their citizens.236 If 
modern federalism is truly a relationship of mutual dependency, 
then administrative balance becomes even more beneficial to this 
relationship. This is because administrative balance gives 
agencies an understanding of its full range of negotiating tools in 
order to reach a deal that both parties want to come to. 
CONCLUSION 
The paper has put forth administrative balance as an 
alternate and beneficial framework in which to view executive 
232. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 223, at 1266-67; see also supra note 210 and
accompanying text; supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
233. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 223, at 1266-67.
234. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 223, at 1266.
235. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 223, at 1267.
236. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 223, at 1267.
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preemption and big waiver. We are in a new era of federalism. In 
this new era, administrative balance clarifies this still uncertain 
relationship between agencies and states. It reassures states that 
executive preemption and big waiver are good things. At best, 
Congress’s laws become more effective and intelligible, affording 
states more certainty to know what will and will not get 
preempted. At the same time, administrative balance bolsters 
federalism by allowing agencies to sit at the metaphorical 
negotiating table and reach compromises that benefit both 
agencies and the states. 
Change is uncertain, even scary. But change can also be 
exciting. We should be excited about administrative balance and 
its dual benefits—clarifying an already existing relationship and 
pushing that relationship towards a more harmonious definition 
of modern federalism. 
